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their definition of these terms when dis-
cussing their own results. Unfortunately,
these definitions often degenerate into
arguments about semantics.
Some of the difficulties outlined above
might be circumvented, to some extent,
by seeking converging evidence from
other experimental methodologies. One
particularly promising approach is behav-
ioral neurophysiology. This approach
can be used to test the key idea that
while the perirhinal cortex may not be
the only area that deals with feature
conjunctions, it is a region ‘‘that contains
perhaps the most complex conjunctive
representations in the ventral visual
stream’’ (Bussey and Saksida, 2002).
Importantly, this method allows for the
analysis of neural coding properties in
the absence of any cognitive demands
beyond viewing of the visual stimulus.
Thus, one testable hypothesis consistent
with the perceptual-mnemonic view is
that neural activity specific to a particular
category of highly complex stimuli would
be seen exclusively (or at least more
prominently) in the perirhinal cortex
compared to upstream visual areas (i.e.,
visual area TE). It would also be possible
to test whether neural correlates of com-
plex or feature-ambiguous stimuli that
are observed in upstream visual areas
(such as area TE) are dependent on peri-
rhinal cortex, by recording from area TE
while perirhinal cortex is reversibly inacti-
vated. Data from this kind of experiment
would allow us to better define the kinds
of visual stimuli processed in these areas
as well as start to explore how these adja-
cent areas (i.e., the perirhinal cortex and
area TE) interact in the processing of
complex visual stimuli, both key issues in
this debate.memory (Lee et al., 2005a; Shrager
et al., 2006). Visual discrimination tasks
where morphed stimuli are compared to
a target stimulus presented next to the
stimuli being discriminated also seem
promising as a behavioral tool to minimize
memory demands (Lee et al., 2005b;
Shrager et al., 2006). The preferential
looking paradigm used by Bartko et al.
(2007) also follows this general strategy
and is also potentially promising, though
the possibility that rats used a working
memory-like strategy to perform this
task with large 3D objects must be
addressed. Although a ‘‘memory-proof’’
task of perception that does not engage
MTL-dependent memory functions has
yet to be developed for animals, it will be
important to use key elements from
previous paradigms together with other
yet-to-be developed tasks/approaches
to develop improved tests of perception
that do not engage the MTL-dependent
memory.
Another fundamental issue germane to
this debate is whether it is even possible
to test perceptual performance in the
absence of learning or memory require-
ments. This is a challenging issue for a
number of reasons. First, it is difficult to
know what behavioral strategies animals
or humans are using to solve a given
task. So, for example, even if an animal
performs a simple discrimination well,
this does not guarantee that it will not
apply a different strategy to the same
task with much more difficult to discrimi-
nate stimuli. Second, the resolution of
this question depends on the precise
terms that are used to define ‘‘memory’’
and ‘‘perception’’ as independent of one
another, and there is currently little agree-
ment on these terms. Thus, one construc-
tive outcome of this debate would be toThe current controversy in the literature
concerning the putative role of the medial
temporal lobe in perception has attracted
so much attention because it challenges
a fundamental tenet of a well-established
view of the organization of memory in the
brain. The medial temporal lobe memory
system (MTLMS) view states that the
medial temporal lobe is specialized for
declarative/relational memory function
including both episodic and semantic
memory with little or no substantial role
in perception (Eichenbaum and Cohen,
2001; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991).
As we have both reviewed in the
preceding articles, evidence from both
animal and human studies has been
used to argue that the MTL and in partic-
ular the perirhinal cortex is critical for
certain forms of perception, often referred
to as the perceptual-mnemonic hypoth-
esis of MTL function. Although opinions
remain highly polarized on this topic, there
are several key theoretical and technical
points that both sides can agree upon.
Below we summarize/synthesize these
points and outline several possible direc-
tions for future research that may help
resolve this controversy.
A central theoretical issue at the core of
this controversy is the distinction between
memory and perception. The ability to
generate testable predictions that can
differentiate the MTLMS hypothesis from
the perceptual-mnemonic hypothesis of
MTL function depends strongly on agree-
ment about the tasks and specific testing
methods that are used to examine
perceptual functions in both animals and
humans. For example, tasks in which
trial-unique stimuli are available for
simultaneous comparison would seem to
place maximal demands on perceptual
processes and minimal demands on
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OverviewAnother main point that most would
agree on is the idea that the anatomical
localization of the amnesic patients used
in studies of the perception/memory
debate must be fully characterized,
including possible damage to lateral
temporal cortex, in order to fully compare
findings across studies. There remains
substantial disagreement in the literature
as to the success with which this anatom-
ical localization has been carried out
across various patient groups (Lee et al.,
2005b; Shrager et al., 2006). To address
this issue, consensus must be reached
on themost appropriate methods for doc-
umenting and measuring the extent of
brain damage in humans with MTL
lesions, so that patient populations
available to different research groups
can be compared in terms of the extent
and selectivity of their lesions. Questions
about the extent of lesions have
hampered progress in human neuropsy-
chology and, to some extent, in studies
with animals as well, although for different
reasons. An effort to develop consensuscriteria for imaging and volumetric proto-
cols in human patients with MTL damage
would help to reduce the concerns about
the interpretability of studies based on
the extent of lesions. This is essential
because, ultimately, neuropsychology
addresses the question of whether a
structure is necessary for a particular
aspect of cognition, which is the key
question in understanding how neural
dysfunction gives rise to cognitive impair-
ment in disease.
The concept that theMTL is specialized
for memory and not for perception has
been a highly influential one in the field,
but it must withstand the test of scrutiny
from subjects with highly selective brain
damage and from more specific tests of
perception. At this point, the evidence
for a role of the MTL in perception is
provocative but is still subject to alterna-
tive interpretations. However, with the
addition of more specific tasks of percep-
tion, hypothesis-based neurophysiology
studies together with strict criteria for
how the extent of lesions are describedNeuronin human neuropsychological studies,
we feel that this controversy has a good
chance of ultimately being resolved.
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